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Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth
Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary
Financial Market
Jay B Kesten
ABSTRACT
Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value?
This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this
question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary
greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability,
takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The
mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that
entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies
agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies
(Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick
(2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion,
finding statistically significant negative correlations between
entrenchment and stock returns during the historic bull market of the
1990s. However, there is no a priori reason to conclude that these effects
will persist. Rather, a close examination of first principles suggests that
the benefits attributable to the market for corporate control are
substantially minimized during recessions.
Testing this hypothesis using data from the recent economic crisis,
this Article finds that the previously identified, statistically significant
correlations between high entrenchment and negative stock returns
disappeared entirely during the recent financial crisis, even for the most
and least entrenched companies. In fact, the opposite effect was observed:
firms with above-average levels of entrenchment outperformed less
entrenched firms during the sample period. A portfolio buying firms
with above-average entrenchment while simultaneously shorting firms
with below-average entrenchment would have generated statistically
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significant annualized abnormal returns of 5.2%. Moreover, companies
that entrenched themselves the most in the year prior to the current crisis
outperformed companies that either reduced, maintained, or slightly
increased their level of entrenchment. While correlation is not
causation, these findings are consistent with the theory that there are
significant costs, not just benefits, to exposing managers to an
unfettered market for corporate control.
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Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited
I. INTRODUCTION

2006 was a remarkable year for corporate America. Public
companies reported record earnings,1 merger and acquisition activity
reached unprecedented levels,2 and stock markets soared to new
highs.3 Simultaneously, a chill wind swept across Wall Street as the
first cracks appeared in the firmament of the economy, leading to the
deepest recession and greatest economic crisis since the Great
Depression.
Another phenomenon emerged as well: the managers4 of U.S.
public companies entrenched themselves—adopting governance
structures that reduced their exposure to the threat of removal via a
takeover—at an astounding rate. Between 1990 and 2005,
managerial entrenchment levels had remained more or less stable.5 In
2006, however, average entrenchment spiked nearly 50% as
measured by an index of the six most impactful entrenchment
devices: poison pills, staggered boards, executive golden parachutes,
supermajority voting requirements for the approval of mergers, and
limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws and
charters (collectively, the Entrenchment Index or “E-Index”).6 In
1. See, e.g., historical data for the S&P 500, http://www2.standardandpoors.com.
2. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman, Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2006—Can
M&A’s ‘Best of Times’ Get Better?—Private Equity Fuels A Frenzy of Deals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2007, at R5. Indeed, both the absolute number of deals (11,750) and aggregate deal value
($1.484 trillion) remain the highest to date. See FactSet MergerStat, M&A Activity: U.S. and
U.S.
Cross-Border
Transactions,
http://www.factset.com/data/data/factsetmergers
(subscription required) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
3. Historical
data
for
various
indices
can
be
found
at
http://finance.yahoo.com/indices.
4. Unless otherwise noted, I employ “managers,” “management,” and related terms as
shorthand for corporate fiduciaries, including directors, officers, and any other pertinent senior
executives. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the roles or interests of directors on one
hand, and executives on the other, are necessarily uniform or even aligned. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735,
1741 (2006) (arguing that the two groups should not be conflated).
5. See Part IV.B.1, infra, for details of the entrenchment trends summarized here.
Appendix B presents additional historical entrenchment data.
6. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788–94, 813 (2009) [hereinafter BCF] (detailing the
construction of the E-Index and finding that these six devices are highly correlated with
negative stock returns during the 1990s). A working draft of this paper was circulated in 2004.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Farrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?,
(John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion
Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=593423.
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reflected in a public firm’s share price.9 Market participants have
strong incentives to identify such underperforming firms, acquire
control, remedy the firm’s managerial or operational deficiencies,
and realize the resultant capital gain.10 Managers—operating in the
shadow of a possible takeover—are thereby sensitized to market (i.e.,
shareholder) sentiment and incentivized to reduce agency costs and
maximize shareholder value.11 Further, in the event of an actual
change of control, ineffective management is replaced and
shareholders of the target company receive substantial takeover
premiums when tendering their shares.12
Based on this theoretical framework, the market for corporate
control is a powerful mechanism for holding management
accountable to shareholder interests. Indeed, many legal scholars and
economists argue that takeovers are the most important mechanism
of corporate governance.13 Unsurprisingly, many commentators
reason that entrenchment, by insulating managers from the
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control and hindering
actual changes of control in underperforming firms, reduces
shareholder welfare.14

9. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965).
10. Id. at 113 (asserting that the market for corporate control constituted “one of the
most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities” of the time).
11. See id. at 112–13.
12. See infra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 118 (2008) (asserting that “[t]he most important market-inspired
component of the U.S. corporate governance infrastructure is the market for corporate
control”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishney, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 756 (1997) (noting that “[t]akeovers are widely interpreted as the critical corporate
governance mechanism in the United States . . .”).
14. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 120 (“[T]he genius of the market for corporate
control as a corporate governance device is that it improves the quality of the corporate
performance at all publicly held firms whose shares are ‘contestable.’”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 720 (2003) (arguing
that “[w]hen managers have less to fear from takeovers, they fail to reduce costs and have
poorer operating performance, including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales
growth”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1981)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel I] (“[A]ny strategy designed to prevent tender offers
reduces welfare.”); Frank. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel II] (“The
optimal level of regulation of tender offers . . . is zero.”).
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This conclusion is not, however, unanimous. Other
commentators argue that substantial costs arise from an unfettered
market for corporate control, such as short-termism and skewed risk
preferences, and that these costs can be mitigated by insulating
management from the threat of takeovers.15 While most modern
scholarship acknowledges this possibility, proponents of the market
for corporate control as an important mechanism of corporate
governance nevertheless conclude that, on balance, entrenchment
destroys shareholder value.16 This understanding is also reflected in
the behavior of market participants, who generally react negatively to
news of managerial entrenchment and positively to announcements
that such devices will be dismantled.17 Indeed, corporations that
adopt entrenchment mechanisms are typically labeled as having
“poor” corporate governance, in contrast to firms that abstain from
implementing such measures.18
Two recent, influential papers present empirical evidence
consistent with this conventional model. In a seminal article,
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (“GIM”) ranked nearly 1,500 U.S.
public companies on an index of twenty-four governance provisions
related to shareholder rights and managerial entrenchment (the

15. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205–14 (1991);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 305 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145 (1984).
16. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 118 (“Clearly political theory, not economic
theory, is required to explain the regulatory burdens that impede the market for corporate
control.”); Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 720–21 (“Proponents of board veto have also argued
that it might have beneficial effects ex ante . . . . [H]owever, there is currently no empirical
support for the view that these conjectured effects are sufficiently significant to outweigh the
adverse ex ante effects of board veto.”); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,
Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 120–21 (1992) (“The empirical evidence is
most consistent with value-maximizing, efficiency-based explanations of takeovers . . . . Yet the
thrust of regulation is to thwart and burden takeovers, as if they were non-value-maximizing
wealth transfers.”).
17. See notes 54–55, infra, and related text.
18. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1811–12 (2008) (“Firms that adopt devices
to impede control changes are . . . conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate
governance, because the managers of those firms are not subject to the disciplining force of
hostile bids. Correlatively, the absence of such devices is identified as a feature of good
corporate governance.”).
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Governance Index or “G-Index”).19 Using data from 1990 to 1999,
GIM found that firms with the strongest shareholders rights
outperformed firms with governance arrangements most favorable to
management.20 Specifically, a portfolio which purchased the lowest
decile (shareholder-friendly) of G-Index firms and simultaneously
shorted the highest decile of G-Index firms would have generated
statistically significant abnormal annualized returns of 8.5%.21
In a subsequent study, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (“BCF”)
demonstrated that six governance devices—the E-Index provisions
listed above—drove the entirety of GIM’s results; the other eighteen
G-Index provisions had little residual explanatory power or statistical
significance.22 Employing the E-Index factors alone, BCF reported a
substantially
more
robust
negative
correlation
between
entrenchment and stock returns during the 1990s.23 Specifically,
BCF describe a monotonic relationship between entrenchment and
stock returns: each increase in E-Index level would have generated
progressively lower returns.24
In light of these findings, the recent surge of entrenchment
appears difficult to justify in terms of management’s fiduciary
obligations or the shareholder wealth maximization norm that
animates those duties. Or, is it? To date, much of the debate
concerning the market for corporate control takes for granted—
sometimes explicitly, but more often as an implicit assumption—that
the net shareholder wealth-effect of the market for corporate control
is monolithic.25 But, there is no a priori reason to assume that
19. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107 passim (2003).
20. Id. at 109.
21. Id. at 109, 121–25. GIM did not, however, find any statistically significant returns
associated with portfolios that included firms outside the top and bottom 10% on the G-Index.
“Abnormal” returns, in this context, refer to the return on a given portfolio that differs from
the expected return of that portfolio based on a particular asset-pricing model.
22. BCF, supra note 6, at 822–23.
23. Id. at 814–17. By reducing the noise in the G-Index, BCF reported statistically
significant results even when moderately entrenched firms clustered around the middle of the
distribution were included in the portfolios. Id.
24. Id. at 813–14.
25. As to those critical of entrenchment, see the articles cited at note 16, supra. For an
opposing, but similarly monolithic view, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 105 (1979) (“[P]roscribing the ability of companies to defend
against takeovers would adversely affect long-term planning and thereby jeopardize the
economy, the policy considerations in favor of not jeopardizing the economy are so strong that
not even a remote risk is acceptable.”). One notable exception in the theoretical literature is
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governance outcomes remain constant over time.26 To the contrary,
a close examination of first principles, as well as the empirical
evidence to date, suggests that the net impact of managerial
entrenchment depends on several exogenous factors that vary greatly
with the macroeconomic climate.27
In this Article, I present both theory and empirical evidence
consistent with a more dynamic conception of the market for
corporate control. Specifically, I argue that the benefits of the market
for corporate control peak during times of strong economic growth,
which are characterized, in the aggregate, by increased corporate
profitability (along with associated potential for high agency cost)
and markedly increased takeover frequency (along with associated
takeover premiums for target shareholders). However, as the
magnitude of these variables decrease, as is typical during
recessions,28 so too do the benefits conferred by exposure to the
market for corporate control.
A testable hypothesis emerges from this theoretical framework:
the strong, negative correlation between entrenchment and stock
returns observed by GIM and BCF between 1990 and 1999—a
period of historic economic growth—should dissipate during
stagnant or recessionary economic conditions, such as the recent
economic crisis. To the extent that the balance between the costs
and benefits of the market for corporate control is close, the
directionality of the relationship might invert as the costs of shorttermism and skewed risk preferences overtake the benefits
attributable to increased accountability. Put differently, firms with
higher entrenchment might outperform firms with lesser
entrenchment during recessions.

John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). Professor
Coffee persuasively argued that individual takeovers might be either value-increasing or valuedecreasing, depending on firm-specific considerations. Id. at 1148–49. This Article extends
that insight and presents the case that the benefits of the market for corporate control, in the
aggregate, ebb and flow depending on macroeconomic factors.
26. Empirical studies tend to be more cautious in this regard, often noting that there is
no certainty that the reported results will persist in future periods. See, e.g., BCF, supra note 6,
at 786; Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 143–44.
27. See discussion infra Part II.C.
28. Notes 87–90, infra, and related text, set forth descriptive statistics from the recent
economic crisis.
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Extending BCF’s E-Index methodology to the period from July
2007 to December 2008, I find that the results are consistent with
the hypothesis set forth above. First, as predicted, the statistically
significant correlation identified by GIM and BCF disappeared
entirely, even for the most and least entrenched companies. Second,
I find the opposite effect in more moderately entrenched
companies—firms with above-average levels of entrenchment
generally outperformed less entrenched firms during the sample
period. For example, a portfolio buying all firms with below-average
entrenchment and selling short all firms with above-average
entrenchment would have generated statistically significant negative
abnormal returns. The significance of this result is robust to
excluding the financial companies most directly impacted by the
collapse of the real estate, sub-prime mortgage, asset-backed security,
and credit-default swap markets. Third, historical entrenchment does
not fully explain this correlation. In fact, a portfolio of companies
that entrenched themselves the most in the year prior to the sample
period would have generated positive annualized abnormal returns of
2.8%. Ultimately, while correlation is not causation, these findings
are consistent with a more dynamic theory of the market for
corporate control.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the
theoretical and empirical literature concerning the benefits and costs
of the market for corporate control, and the relationship between
entrenchment and stock returns. Part III develops a more dynamic
theory of the market for corporate control, which takes seriously the
prospect that its benefits (reduction of agency costs and generation
of takeover premiums for target shareholders) are substantially
minimized during economic downturns. Part IV details the empirical
analysis of the correlation between entrenchment and stock returns
during the recent financial crisis. Part V summarizes and discusses
the main findings, focusing on plausible explanations for these
results. Part VI presents some concluding remarks.
II. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL AND SHAREHOLDER
VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE TO DATE
The market for corporate control sits at the intersection of two
central debates in modern corporate law: the proper allocation of
authority between shareholders and managers in public companies
on one hand, and the most efficient way to regulate the conduct of
1617
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corporate fiduciaries on the other.29 As such, its regulation has
attracted substantial academic, judicial, and legislative attention. The
core question is simply stated: should shareholders have an
unfettered right to receive and accept hostile tender offers, or is it
desirable to insulate incumbent management (or allow them to
insulate themselves) from this threat?
In considering this important policy question, scholars have
proffered theoretical models illustrating both substantial benefits and
potentially significant costs associated with the market for corporate
control. Arising from this literature are two important empirical
questions. Do the identified benefits outweigh any concomitant
costs? And if so, does this result persist independently of exogenous
factors such as changing macroeconomic conditions? While the
former issue has been debated exhaustively, the latter concern has
received no serious treatment, despite the fact that the empirical
evidence to date contains hints that the net effects of the market for
corporate control vary over time. This Part briefly describes the main
theoretical models of the market for corporate control, and then
surveys the empirical evidence bearing on the relationship between
entrenchment and shareholder welfare.
A. Takeovers as Corporate Governance
Many scholars assert that a vigorous market for corporate control
performs a critical role in disciplining, monitoring, and replacing
underperforming management teams, which neither intra-corporate
constituencies (such as shareholders and boards of directors), nor
courts can replicate easily or cheaply.30 Stemming from Henry
29. Collectively, these two issues subsume the majority of what is regularly termed
“corporate governance.” See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Unentrapped, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
677, 680 (2009) (“Corporate law debates center on three overlapping topics: (1) the
appropriate scope of regulation and the degree of reliance accorded state authority or,
alternatively, private ordering, in organizing firms and solving problems; (2) the boundaries of
the firm and the firm’s responsibility to outsiders; and (3) the terms of the corporate agency
relationship and the allocation of authority within the firm.”). In making this statement,
however, I offer no opinion on whether these issues should be the primary focus of modern
corporate law. Similarly, for the purposes of this paper, I assume arguendo that the shareholder
wealth maximization norm ought to guide corporate decision-making.
30. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 121; Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at
1170–73; Manne, supra note 9, at 113. By way of example, many commentators argue that
neither shareholders nor directors are particularly effective corporate monitors due to collective
action problems on the part of the former, and incentive/capture concerns as to the latter. As
to collective action problems, see, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389–400 (1986)
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Manne’s seminal article, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, the standard law-and-economics model posits that control
of a corporation is a valuable asset independent of either economies
of scale or potential monopoly rents.31 Market participants thus

(explaining rational apathy, collective action problems, and other related factors that drive
shareholder passivity), and MACEY, supra note 13, at 131 (arguing that “[i]t would be highly
irrational for individual investors to spend significant resources on corporate governance
because the expected payoff any individual shareholder stands to gain from ensuring good
management performance is so small in relation to the required investment”). For a discussion
of board capture and other hurdles to effective corporate monitoring, see MACEY, supra note
13, at 53–68. Moreover, while legal recourse—such as the derivative suit—can be effective
with respect to various forms of self-dealing, the vast majority of potential “agency cost” cases
challenging strategic business decisions would be dismissed at the pleadings stage by virtue of
the protections afforded by the business judgment rule. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Einer R.
Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 29 (Bruce Hay et al. eds., 2005)
(commenting that “under the business judgment rule, courts are extraordinarily willing to
sustain decisions that apparently sacrifice profits, at least in the short run, on the ground that
they may conceivably maximize profits, at least in the long run”). Claims for shirking and/or
failure to monitor are only slightly more viable, having famously been termed by former
Delaware Chancellor William Allen as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” In re Caremark Int’l Inc. S’holder
Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); accord In re Citigroup Inc. Sh. Derivative
Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). For a detailed treatment of the development of the duty
of oversight/failure to monitor claims, see Reinier Kraakman & Jay Kesten, The Story of Francis
v. United Jersey Bank: When A Good Story Makes Bad Law, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 163–
93 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). In any event, shareholder litigation is extraordinarily costly,
and thus is only rarely in the best economic interests of either the shareholders in question or
the corporation more generally. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 30, at 32–38 (arguing that
shareholder litigation is a highly inefficient way of enforcing any profit maximization norm);
Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1736 (1994) (asserting that there are only limited circumstances
where derivative suits increase corporate value); MACEY, supra note 13, at 130–54 (arguing
that “[i]t is highly unlikely that shareholders would voluntarily agree to opt into an expensive
private litigation system such as the one that exists in the United States that allows plaintiffs’
class action attorneys to extort billions of dollars from companies, and requires shareholders
acquiesce in lawsuits in which massive amounts of money are transferred from one group of
investors to another or, worse still, from investors to lawyers.”).
31. Manne, supra note 9, at 112; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?” 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1027 (1997) (“According to . . .
the ‘free market’ view—tender offers were the great engine of managerial accountability and
efficiency . . . . On this view, takeover entrepreneurs benefited shareholders and society as a
whole by moving assets to their highest and best use, by disciplining bad managers, and paying
premia to target shareholders.”). As the contours and implications of this model have been
treated exhaustively elsewhere, a brief summary suffices for the purposes of this Article. For a
representative sample of the literature on takeovers as a key mechanism of corporate
governance, see MACEY, supra note 13, at 118–22; Coffee, supra note 15, 1199–220; Lucian
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possess strong incentives to monitor and identify underperforming
firms (as reflected by the company’s stock price), acquire control,
remedy the firm’s managerial or operational deficiencies, and realize
the resultant capital gain.32 The greater a firm’s market valuation
diverges from its potential value under some other business strategy
or resource allocation—especially relative to similarly situated
companies in its industry or sector—the greater are the incentives for
potential acquirors, thereby increasing the likelihood of a takeover.33
Incumbent management is typically replaced in the event of a
successful hostile takeover, leading to lost compensation (and other
non-monetary benefits of their positions), personal disruption, and
potentially reputational harm.34 As such, rationally-acting managers
will seek to avoid having their firms taken over, especially in
circumstances that suggest they failed at their respective tasks.35
Given that hostile bids are typically forthcoming only if and when a
firm is underpriced by the market relative to some alternative
strategy or allocation of resources, incumbent managers have strong
Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973,
991–94 (2002); Easterbrook & Fischel I and II, supra note 14, passim; Romano, supra note
16, at 129–33.
32. Manne, supra note 9, at 113 (asserting that the market for corporate control
constituted “one of the most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities” of the time).
33. The so-called “Wall Street Rule”—which posits that dissatisfied shareholders
typically sell their shares rather than expend resources to change a corporation’s operations or
governance—can amplify this effect. See Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups:
Voting Selling, and Limits on the Board’s Power to “Just Say No”, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1002
(1999) (describing the “Wall Street Rule”).
34. See Romano, supra note 16, at 122–23 (surveying evidence showing that turnover is
markedly higher in firms that undergo hostile takeovers, as compared to friendly mergers and
companies in which there is no change of control). Courts, too, have long recognized this
circumstance as one of the classic corporate conflicts of interest. As the Delaware Supreme
Court famously opined, whenever a board takes steps to thwart an unsolicited takeover bid,
there is an “omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests [i.e.,
to preserve incumbent managements’ jobs], rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); accord
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
134 (2008) (remarking that unsolicited takeover bids are “[t]he paradigm[atic] conflict of
interest”).
35. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6–7 (1983). Jensen and Ruback theorize this point
rigorously, positing an alternative, but related, description of the market for corporate control
in which managers themselves compete for the right to manage corporate resources. Id. Judge
Richard Posner simply observes that “[n]o one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or
also an officer.” Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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incentives to operate firms to their full potential, and thereby
maximize shareholder value.
Based on this theoretical framework, the market for corporate
control creates shareholder value both directly and indirectly. First,
in the event of an actual change of control, shareholders of target
companies receive substantial acquisition premiums when tendering
their shares.36 Second, and perhaps more importantly for the
purposes of corporate governance, the market for corporate control
deters agency costs systemically, even in the absence of an actual
takeover bid, by holding managers accountable to market (i.e.,
shareholder) sentiment.37 Pursuant to this model, any regulation of
the takeover market—including intra-corporate managerial
entrenchment—interferes with these benefits.38
36. Several meta-studies posit differing estimates for average premiums. For example,
Professor Macey reports that such premiums often amount to 50% of the target firm’s pre-bid
share price. See MACEY, supra note 13, at 119 (citing Theodore Baums and Kenneth E. Scott,
Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany, 17 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 59 (2005); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 52 (1988)). In an earlier study,
Jensen and Ruback suggest a more modest average premium of approximately 30%. Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 35, at 4. Based on recent ThomsonOne data spanning 1990 to 2009, the
average takeover premium for target companies trading on the NASDAQ and New York Stock
Exchange was approximately 39%. Appendix E presents historical takeover premium data.
37. Some commentators argue that there are additional social benefits, in that the
market for corporate control identifies and removes underperforming managers. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1169 (emphasizing the monitoring function of the
takeover market). There is, however, no guarantee that removing certain managers actually
improves corporate performance, or that the replacements are necessarily better managers than
those removed. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1159 (arguing that “the simple view that
takeovers mean that good managements replace bad oversimplifies the more complex reality
that corporate cultures are not easily changed, and abrupt efforts to do so may result more in
demoralization than increased efficiency”).
38. See, e.g., the authorities cited supra notes 14, 16. This conclusion has even received
limited endorsement by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
643 (1982) (“[T]he effects of . . . block[ing] a tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are
deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic
resources to their highest valued use . . . is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism
provides incumbent managers to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.”). It
is also noteworthy that until recently, the conventional wisdom among both academics and
market participants was that once a target was put “in play” by a hostile offer, it would
generally be sold either to the initial bidder or to a white knight notwithstanding any takeover
defenses in place. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887, 901–02 & nn.50, 54 (2002). However, Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian demonstrate
that certain takeover defenses substantially increase the chance that a target will remain
independent in the face of a hostile bid. Id. at 929–31 (finding that effective staggered boards
nearly double the likelihood of remaining independent in both the short-run (9 months) and
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B. The Dark Side of the Market for Corporate Control?
Opponents of hostile takeovers paint a starkly different picture of
the market for corporate control. Gone is the benign, low cost/high
efficacy monitoring and disciplining regime described above; in its
place, a Schumpeterian whirlwind of creative destruction fueled by
speculators, arbitrageurs and other corporate raiders.39 In his now
famous manifesto, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, Martin
Lipton asserted that the stakes were no less than the very fabric of
the American economy:
It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the longterm interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be
jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality
and continued existence of the business enterprise in which they have
bought shares, but only in a quick profit on the sale of those shares?
The overall health of the economy should not in the slightest
degree be made subservient to the interests of certain shareholders
in realizing a profit on a takeover.40

Rhetoric aside, scholars have identified three main categories of
plausible costs and diseconomies associated with an unfettered
market for corporate control. The two most important for our
purposes are behavioral. First, recalling that the market for corporate
long-run (30 months) after an unsolicited bid). Moreover, at least as a matter of theory, the
mere existence of any entrenchment mechanisms may deter some certain bids from being made
at all. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1177–80; Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra
note 14, passim. Easterbrook & Fischel argue that the existence of takeover defenses is more
likely to lead to an auction, in which subsequent players free-ride on the due diligence
performed by the initial bidder. Insofar as these sunk costs (and related opportunity costs) are
high, there is less incentive for outsiders to expend resources monitoring firms for
underperformance in the first instance, and thus fewer initial bids will be made. Id.
39. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom:
Burke versus Schumpeter, 60 BUS. LAW. 1419 (2005); Rock, supra note 31, at 1027
(“According to one view—the ‘managerialist’ view—hostile tender offers were bad for
companies, communities, and society as a whole. From this perspective, the 1980s were a
dangerous time, with sharks circling proud and once-proud companies, looking for any sign of
weakness, and then moving in for the kill. In the process, enormous debt was incurred,
companies were destroyed, assets sold off, the work of generations of expansion lost, and the
nation mortgaged its future.”).
40. Lipton, supra note 25, at 104. Lipton’s critique also encompasses the possibility that
heightened takeover activity creates substantial negative externalities beyond the interaction
between shareholders and managers. Specifically, the disruption inherent in a vigorous takeover
market could affect debt-holders, employees, customers, suppliers, and potentially even
communities in which target firms are located. While I do not address this potential cost
directly herein, it is certainly worth noting.

1622

DO NOT DELETE

1609

2/16/2011 12:55 PM

Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited

control monitors performance via stock price, managers who are fully
exposed to the threat of takeovers may favor short-term projects or
other endeavors geared primarily towards buoying the value of their
firm’s shares, notwithstanding any long-term detriment to their
company’s operations.41 While the prevalence and magnitude of
“short-termism” has long been contested among academics,42 there
is now a growing body of evidence suggesting that it is an
economically meaningful trend amongst public companies. For
example, in a recent study, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal identified
two ubiquitous themes among public company management: (1)
managers see an express trade-off between long-term value
maximizing investment decisions and the short-term need to “deliver
earnings”; and (2) managers believe that the market often overreacts
to earnings missed.43 Based on interviews with more than 400 public
company CFOs, Graham et al. report that 78% of the surveyed
executives admitted to sacrificing long-term firm value in order to
“smooth” earnings or hit analysts’ targets for a particular quarter.44
It is reasonable to infer that these pressures described by Graham et
al. may be amplified in firms where managers are exposed to the
market for corporate control.
A related concern is that, regardless of time horizon, the threat
of takeovers may skew managers’ risk preferences. Specifically,
managers operating in the shadow of the market for corporate
control may rationally prefer higher-risk ventures or business
strategies.45 This concern is particularly acute if competitors have

41. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 205–14.
42. Compare, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J.
POLIT. ECON. 61 (1988) (formally modeling the potential that the threat of takeovers leads to
managerial short-termism), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & Lars Stole, Do Short-Term Managerial
Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719 (1993)
(arguing that the threat of unsolicited takeovers actually leads to excessive investment in longterm projects).
43. John R. Graham et al. , The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting,
40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2005) (noting that “many executives feel that they are choosing
the lesser evil by sacrificing long-term value to avoid short-term turmoil”).
44. Id. at 4–5.
45. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1243 (arguing that “the greater danger involves a likely
shift in managerial attitudes towards greater tolerance for risk”). Absent entrenchment devices,
companies may also restructure their operations in potentially undesirably ways so as to make
themselves less attractive as a takeover target. For example, managers may deplete their cash
reserves, increase indebtedness, or acquire other companies for reasons wholly unrelated to
long-term wealth creation. Id. at 1243–44.
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elected to do the same because the market may punish firms that
pursue conservative growth strategy if the dangers inherent in
alternative high-risk strategies do not manifest themselves in the
short term or are sufficiently opaque to outsiders. The empirical
evidence on this point is circumstantial, but suggestive. For instance,
in a multi-national study of bank performance during the economic
crisis, Beltratti and Stulz found that banks with the most “proshareholder” boards performed substantially worse than those with
much less shareholder-friendly governance structures (including, but
not limited to, entrenchment devices).46 They conclude that the
most likely explanation is that “shareholder-friendly” banks “were
pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the
crisis [and] took risks that were understood to create shareholder
wealth, but were costly ex post because of the outcomes that were
not expected when the risks were taken.”47
Second, if managers are perpetually subjected to the threat of
losing their jobs after any dip in the firm’s share price—whether
warranted by a meaningful change in the company’s fundamental
performance or not—they may invest fewer personal resources to
develop the firm-specific skills necessary to maximize operational
efficiency.48 This “demoralization cost” is not limited to executives,
given the high rate of layoffs and uncertainty among lower-level

46. Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the
Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation 3, 14–15
(European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 254/2009,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1433502.
47. Id. at 3. Beltratti and Stulz also acknowledge that the market can incorrectly assess
risk, and may reward companies that generate high short-term gains, regardless of the potential
long-term consequences associated with the strategy. Id. at 2, 21. Others have argued that
incentives exist to take such risks even if potentially costly long-term outcomes were expected.
See, e.g., DINO FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN POLITICS, LAW, AND BUSINESS 87 (2009)
(discussing the dangers of “tail risk” strategies in which financial managers, insurance
companies or other firms “expose themselves to small chances of incurring large losses” and
thus “appear to outperform the market . . . [o]ver short time-horizons.”); Sheila C. Bair,
Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the Causes
and Current State of the Financial Crisis before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Jan.
14,
2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan1410.html
(“Corporate sector practices also had the effect of distorting of decision-making away from
long-term profitability and stability and toward short-term gains with insufficient regard for
risk.”).
48. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 304–09; FALASCHETTI, supra note 47, at 101–
13.
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employees in the aftermath of a change of control.49 In sum, the
threat of takeovers may impact the labor market, potentially making
it more difficult (or at least more expensive) for companies with
greater takeover exposure to hire and retain high-quality
management and employees.50
The third category is primarily epistemic. Due to informational
asymmetries (coupled with various collective action problems
endemic to dispersed shareholdings), target shareholders will rarely,
if ever, be able to assess whether a tender offer is adequately priced.51
Consequently, in the absence of a managerial stop-gap, public
company shareholders can—and will—tender into undervalued bids,
and thus facilitate inefficient transfers of control. Here, the benefit of
entrenchment is that managers—who are not plagued by the
epistemic and collective action problems faced by shareholders—can
deploy (or rely on pre-existing) defensive measures in an effort to
extract higher acquisition premiums through a negotiated
transaction, or to block final bids deemed inadequate.52
Each of these phenomena, which are by no means mutually
exclusive, suggests that even if the market for corporate control
confers substantial benefits on shareholders, there are attendant,
non-trivial costs as well. Accordingly, the most accurate theoretical
model of the market for corporate control must allow for an
aggregate of both value-increasing and value-decreasing effects.53

49. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1238–42 (summarizing the literature concerning
takeovers, assimilation difficulties, and employee motivation).
50. Id. at 1234–38 (arguing that “the cost of attaining perfect competition in the
market for corporate control is substantial impairment of the efficiency of the executive labor
market”).
51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1452–53 (2005) (arguing that “director
authority to fend off a hostile takeover bid can protect shareholders from their own ignorance
in cases where an irrational market either undervalues the target’s stock, or overvalues the
bidder’s”); Lipton, supra note 25, at 106–12.
52. In a series of classic takeover cases, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted this line of
reasoning to approve various defensive strategies adopted by boards of target companies. See,
e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153–54 (Del. 1989) (holding
that the “inadequate value” of an all cash offer for all shares is a “legally cognizable threat,” to
which target boards can respond by deploying defensive measures); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383–85 (Del. 1995) (same, noting that shareholders might tender
into an undervalued offer “in ignorance or based on a mistaken belief” concerning the value of
their shares).
53. This conclusion is presented more rigorously in Part III, infra. Perhaps implicitly
recognizing this dynamic, the current state of the law is largely permissive. While there are
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The question that necessarily arises is this: which side of the ledger
outweighs the other? The following sub-section surveys the empirical
literature addressing this issue.
C. The Empirical Evidence Thus Far
Researchers have recently employed various empirical
methodologies to assess the relationship between governance
arrangements—including entrenchment devices—and shareholder
wealth. With few exceptions, these studies find a negative correlation
between entrenchment and several measures of firm performance,
including stock price. However, as illustrated below, little attention
has been paid to whether these effects change in differing
macroeconomic environments.
One group of studies examines the impact of specific events on
stock price. Numerous researchers find that shareholders enjoy
substantial, positive abnormal returns when their companies actually
receive a takeover bid.54 Other studies find a negative correlation
between the adoption of various entrenchment mechanisms and firm
value and/or stock returns. Faleye reports that announcing the
adoption of a staggered board generates negative abnormal returns.55
Similarly, Guo et al. find that announcing the dismantling of a
staggered board generates positive abnormal returns.56 Collectively,
these studies suggest that market participants generally view
entrenchment as a value-decreasing phenomenon.
certain widely-applicable regulatory constraints on the market for corporate control, courts
have largely left the adoption of takeover defenses to the discretion of individual firms. For a
more detailed discussion of this judicial balance, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 136–40.
54. MACEY, supra note 13, at 118 (“[S]tudies have found uniformly and unanimously
that regardless of the time period or acquisitive form, there are statistically significant positive
abnormal returns on the investments of shareholders in companies that receive takeover
bids.”); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 230 (1993)
(reviewing empirical studies). What is less clear is whether any particular acquisition actually
creates value in the aggregate, or simply redistributes wealth amongst participants. For
example, the stock prices of public acquirors tend to decline on average, at least in the short
term. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 9TH ED.
905–06 (2008); Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from
Corporate Acquisitions, 52 J. FIN. 1765 (1997); P. Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen,
Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. ECON.
223 (1998).
55. Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83
J. FIN. ECON. 501 (2007).
56. Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover
Force of Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274 (2008).
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Another group of studies examines the impact of certain
governance arrangements on various measures of firm performance
over time. Some analyze individual governance provisions,57 while
others attempt to create a more comprehensive framework via
indexing several related devices. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(“GIM”) created an index of twenty-four corporate governance
provisions (the “G-Index”) that allocate decision-making authority
between shareholders and management (including many provisions
related to the firm’s exposure to the market for corporate control).58
After ranking approximately 1,500 companies on this scale and
controlling for various factors, they found that firms with strong
managerial protections (high G-Index scores) were less profitable
and had lower sales growth than similarly situated firms with greater
shareholder rights (low G-Index scores).59 GIM also found that
during the 1990s, the share price of firms in the lowest decile of the
G-Index (what they termed the “democracy portfolio”)
outperformed firms in the highest decile of the G-Index (the
“dictatorship portfolio”). In fact, an investment strategy based on
buying the “democracy portfolio” while simultaneously shorting the
“dictatorship portfolio” would have generated statistically significant
abnormal returns of 8.5% per year during the 1990s.60 However, for
firms nearer to the median of the G-Index, they found no statistically
significant abnormal returns.61
Refining GIM’s methodology, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
(“BCF”) demonstrated that six governance provisions (the “EIndex”)—each directly related to the market for corporate control—
account almost entirely for GIM’s findings, and that the other
57. For example, both Cremers & Nair and Bebchuk & Cohen find that several
governance provisions are negatively correlated with firm value (as approximated by Tobin’s
Q). See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON.
409 (2005); K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices,
60 J. FIN. 2859 (2005).
58. GIM identify five categories of provisions: tactics for delaying hostile bidders,
director/officer protections, other takeover defenses, limits on shareholder voting rights, and
state laws. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 110–13.
59. Id. at 109–10, 119–29.
60. Id. at 109, 121–25. GIM also found that high G-Index had larger capital
expenditures and were significantly more likely to acquire other firms, but enjoyed lower firm
value, profits, and sales growth. GIM posit that one interpretation of their results is that “highG firms engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment during the 1990s.”
Id. at 137; see also id. at 133–137.
61. Id. at 121–25.
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eighteen G-Index factors were statistically insignificant.62 BCF’s
findings are particularly relevant to this Article’s methodology and
analysis. First, BCF found that the average monthly returns during
the 1990s for portfolios of companies with the same E-Index scores
dropped monotonically as entrenchment increased.63 Second,
employing a regression analysis, they found highly significant,
positive abnormal returns for portfolios taking a long position in less
entrenched firms, and simultaneously shorting more entrenched
firms.64 Unlike the GIM study, BCF found that these abnormal
returns were statistically significant even when firms clustered around
the middle of the distribution (i.e., firms with only moderate levels
of entrenchment) were included in the portfolios.65
Collectively, these findings are striking: variations in corporate
governance structures—and managerial entrenchment in particular—
are highly correlated, both statistically and economically, with
negative shareholder returns throughout the 1990s. There are,
however, several hints in the existing literature that this correlation
may not persist during periods with materially different
macroeconomic conditions. GIM’s findings are confined to the
1990s, a period of sustained and historic growth in the stock market.
Subsequent work using a similar methodology and extending the
sample size through 2001 (i.e., including the market downturn
associated with the tech bubble collapse), however, found no such
statistically significant correlation.66 Additionally, Beltratti and Stulz

62. BCF, supra note 6, at 822–23.
63. Id. at 813–14.
64. Id. at 814–17. BCF report that this correlation holds not only for the GIM sample
period (1990–1999) but also the period spanning 1990–2003. Id. at 819–20.
65. Id. at 819–20.
66. See Cremers & Nair, supra note 57. There are, however, divergent opinions on how
to interpret the Cremers & Nair results. Compare BCF, supra note 6, at 819 with Bhagat et al.,
supra note 18, at 1830–32. While BCF extended their sample to include data from 1990 to
2003, two aspects of their expanded findings are noteworthy. First, their sample includes not
only the bear market of 2000–2001, but also the period of recovery immediately thereafter.
Second, comparing their results for 1990–1999 with their results for 1990–2003, there is a
decrease in abnormal returns for 12 of their 20 portfolios, suggesting a reduction in the
abnormal returns attributable to the period from 2000-2003. See BCF, supra note 6, at 816,
820. A recent working paper by Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang lends further support to this
intuition, reporting that neither the G-Index nor the E-Index is associated with abnormal
returns during the period from 2000-2008, or in any four-year sub-period throughout that
sample. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning and the
Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns (John M. Olin Center for Law,
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report that banks with the most shareholder-friendly corporate
governance structures fared the worst during the recent economic
crisis,67 but that the banks which performed worst during the recent
recession had also generated the highest returns in the period
immediately prior.68
While these evidentiary fragments suggest that macroeconomic
climate might play a meaningful role in the relationship between
entrenchment and shareholder value, there has been no serious
theoretical consideration of this possibility.69 The following sections
present both theory and evidence that the net effects of the market
for corporate control are indeed variable, and depend on factors
closely linked to prevailing economic conditions.
III. THE INHERENT VARIABILITY OF THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL
Why might the net wealth-effect of the market for corporate
control change over time? One answer lies in the operation of the
market for corporate control itself, and the mechanism by which it
confers benefits on shareholders. As described in Part II, supra, there
are likely both benefits (e.g., reduced agency costs, takeover
premiums, and replacement of inefficient managers) and costs (e.g.,
short-termism, skewed risk preferences, “demoralization costs,” and
the possibility of inefficient transfers of control) associated with
exposure to the market for corporate control. One might
approximate—albeit simplistically—the aggregate impact of the
takeover market as follows:
NSWmcc = {PRAC + Pprem + . . . + Ns-t + Nineff . . .}

Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 667, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589731.
67. Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 3.
68. Id. at 2.
69. In fact, while the GIM and BCF studies have attracted substantial attention, the
main thrust of most critics has been to question causality. See, e.g., John E. Core, Wayne R.
Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655
(2006); Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro, & Mengxin Zhao, Governance Indices and Valuation:
Which Causes Which?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 907 (2007). This important issue is addressed further
in Part V, infra.
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where the net shareholder wealth effect attributable to the market for
corporate control (NSWmcc) is the sum of the reduced agency costs
(PRAC), takeover premiums received (Pprem), etc., plus the sum of the
effects of short-termism and other disruption in the boardroom (Ns), losses attributable to inefficient acquisitions (Nineff), etc. In this
t
model, P-elements create shareholder value, while N-elements
generate countervailing negative effects.
However, just as there is no way to know, a priori, whether
NSWmcc is positive or negative, there is similarly no reason to believe
that NSWmcc remains constant. In fact, a close examination of first
principles suggests that the values of several of these elements might
vary substantially depending on factors, such as the firm profitability
and the relative volume/valuation of takeovers, which themselves
vary depending on the economic climate. This section develops a
more comprehensive, dynamic theory of the market for corporate
control by considering how its net effects depend on these
underlying macroeconomic factors.
A. The Effects of Decreased Profitability
As illustrated in Part II, supra, the takeover threat creates
shareholder value by deterring managerial inefficiency and reducing
agency costs. In order to understand how the magnitude of valuecreation might change over time, it is necessary to clarify what
exactly is being deterred. Widely-held public companies, which are
characterized by the separation of ownership and control, exemplify
an agency relationship.70 Shareholders in these companies are almost
uniformly passive investors who delegate authority over virtually
every corporate decision to the board of directors, which in turn
delegates much of the day-to-day management to the corporation’s
officers and other senior executives.71 Notwithstanding the myriad
70. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (1932). Some commentators challenge the view that shareholders are
in any meaningful way the “owners” of a corporation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 800
n.52 (2002) (arguing “[s]hareholders do not own the corporation” because “ownership is not
a meaningful concept” in the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation). These
structural/philosophical concerns do not, however, negate the existence of agency costs or the
mechanisms through which they can be minimized by the market for corporate control.
71. Indeed, this corporate structure is codified by statute as the default rule. See, e.g.,
Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be

1630

DO NOT DELETE

1609

2/16/2011 12:55 PM

Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited

benefits associated with this structure, costs inevitably arise where
decision-making authority is delegated from principals (i.e.,
shareholders) to agents (i.e., managers).72 While these “agency costs”
take a variety of forms, the category with which we are principally
concerned here arises where the agents’ interests, and thus their use
of corporate resources, diverge from those of their principals.73
Shareholders’ primary—if not exclusive—interest is to maximize
their returns.74 In a idealized world, managers, as fiduciaries, would
never act in furtherance of their own interests to the detriment of
their principals. However, in reality, managers can and do take
actions which run contrary to the shareholder wealth maximization
norm, from outright theft or fraud at one extreme, to shirking or
inattention at the other. Between these two poles lies a vast universe
of possible business decisions in which managers’ preferences differ
from those of shareholders.75 Because many of the most extreme
behaviors that lead to agency costs (such as theft, fraud, and selfdealing) are heavily regulated by statutory, fiduciary, and even
criminal regimes, one might reasonably expect that the additional
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
72. For a classic treatment of agency costs in the corporate context, see Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
73. Jensen & Meckling term this set of costs the “residual loss.” Id. at 308. They
identify other agency costs as: (1) monitoring costs borne by the principal, and (2) bonding
costs borne by the agent. Id. In theory, the existence of, and exposure to, a vibrant market for
corporate control might also minimize these monitoring and bonding costs, e.g., insofar as the
threat of takeovers reduces the need for direct shareholder oversight. In practice, however, the
magnitude of this effect is rather uncertain for two reasons. First, the market for corporate
control is blind to managerial conduct that does not manifest in a reduced share price, such as
fraud or other acts that artificially inflate a firm’s stock price. See MACEY, supra note 13, at
119. Thus, exposure to the market for corporate control does not remove entirely the need for
monitoring and/or bonding. Second, given the strong theoretical basis for rational shareholder
apathy, see note 29, supra, especially for diversified investors, it is unclear how much
monitoring cost is actually borne by the average public firm shareholder.
74. This statement is admittedly an oversimplification. Even as to purely financial
matters, shareholders’ interests are not entirely uniform. For example, shareholders can differ
greatly as to risk profile, investment horizon and/or tax circumstances. As a general matter,
though, it is fair to say that virtually all investors would prefer that the value of their shares
increases rather than decreases.
75. For example, managers may prefer more or less risky endeavors, differing
distribution schemes (dividend vs. share buyback), capital structures (debt vs. equity), or
growth strategies (organic vs. acquisition). In making any or all of these decisions, managers
may be tempted to pursue a course of conduct that inures to their benefit, even if outcomes
are not optimal for shareholders.
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deterrence provided by the market for corporate control with respect
to these issues is marginal.76 The takeover market is thus most
effective at constraining behavior such as shirking, inattention, or
inefficient allocation of resources.
The latter is of particular note because it has long been theorized
that free cash flow constitutes one of the major sources of agency
costs within a firm.77 With respect to the the market for corporate
control as a mechanism of corporate governance, it is useful to
expand this conception to include profitability more generally. As
companies generate profits in excess of their need to fund current,
positive net-present-value projects (or service debt, etc.), managers
are faced with a decision as to how the excess cash should be
deployed. On one hand, it can be used to create shareholder value in
the form of dividends, share repurchases, or investments in new
wealth-creating projects. On the other, it might be diverted to create
private benefits for managers via increased compensation,
organizational inefficiency, “pet” investments near or below the cost
of capital, or various other uses that fail to maximize shareholder
value. For example, if senior executives perceive that they can
command higher compensation by increasing the size of the firm
under management, they may employ corporate resources to pursue
costly empire-building acquisition strategies that fail to generate
meaningful shareholder value.78 Viewed less cynically, agency costs
76. Moreover, the traditional theory rests upon a series of assumptions that poor
performance is hard to hide in reasonably efficient capital markets. As illustrated vividly by
Enron and Worldcom, though, many of the more egregious forms of misconduct involve
artificially inflating a company’s value/stock price. The market for corporate control cannot
detect this type of problem ex ante, and after the machinations are uncovered, it is often too
late. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 119.
77. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 passim (1986); Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 133.
78. Some commentators argue that this very dynamic explains the wave of conglomerate
mergers during the 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding the questionable fiscal merit (and
ultimate failure) of most of these diversification ventures. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 444 (2001) (asserting
that “[t]he collapse of the conglomerate movement in the 1970s and 1980s . . . largely
destroyed the normative appeal of the managerialist model. It is now the conventional wisdom
that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment policies, they tend to
serve disproportionately their own interests, however well-intentioned [they] may be”). Given
that shareholders can diversify their own holdings much more easily and cheaply than can
corporations, it is unclear whether these decisions are truly intended to benefit shareholders, or
whether the primary impetus for increasing revenue via diversified acquisitions is instead closely
tied to executive compensation packages. Cf. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 888–89 (citing
diversification as a “dubious reason[] for mergers”).
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may arise even where corporate strategy is shaped by non-pecuniary
motives. For instance, managers’ decisions may be influenced by
what they like (such as projects involving exploration, research and
development, or acquisitions) even if those investments do not
optimize corporate resources.79
Pursuant to the classic model, the takeover threat serves to
minimize these agency costs by incentivizing managers to refrain
from diverting corporate assets, pay closer attention to corporate
affairs, and scrutinize proposed projects carefully to determine
whether they maximize shareholder value.80 By insulating managers
from this disciplinary effect, entrenchment increases the likelihood
that managers will misuse a firm’s excess cash flow.81
As firm profitability decreases, however, managers are faced with
fewer opportunities to divert value from shareholders. Moreover, as
profits dwindle or the firm incurs losses, managers who would
otherwise choose to co-opt private benefits during profitable periods
might hesitate to do so for fear of jeopardizing the company’s
operational viability.82 Put differently, as profitability declines within
a firm, there is generally less potential agency cost for the takeover
market to deter. Consider two firms, A and B, both of which
generate $250 million in profits, above what is needed to fund
current expenses, during year X. A and B are otherwise identical,
except that A has adopted no entrenchment devices, whereas B
employs several. Traditional theory holds that B’s managers will
divert a greater proportion of this profitability to their own private
benefit. All else being equal, the variance in firm value between A

79. See generally, Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35 (describing the prevalence of valuenegative projects in the oil industry in the early 1980s). Indeed, the touchstone of Delaware
takeover jurisprudence— Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum— arose out of exactly this sort of strategic
dispute between incumbent management and a hostile acquirer. 493 A.2d 946, passim (Del.
1985); accord Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 78, at 444 (arguing that “[w]hile
managerial firms may be in some ways more efficiently responsive to nonshareholder interests .
. . the price paid in inefficiency of operations and excessive investment in low-value projects is
now considered too great”).
80. See MACEY, supra note 13, at 118; Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1168–
74.
81. This conclusion is bolstered by GIM’s findings and their proposition that high GIndex firms “engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment.” See Gompers
et al., supra note 19, at 136.
82. It is also possible that as a firm’s profits decrease, so does the prevalence of shirking
among its fiduciaries, who might become more attentive for fear of being fired, bankruptcy,
lawsuits, or the like.
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and B could be as great as the $250 million plus the return on any
portion invested in positive net present value projects. It follows,
then, that if each firm generated only $2 million in profits, the
potential divergence in firm value would be greatly reduced in most
circumstances. Thus, assuming reasonably efficient markets, the stock
price variance between these firms should similarly be reduced. In
terms relevant to the discussion of entrenchment, the aggregate
value of PRAC decreases as profitability decreases.
B. The Effects of Decreased M&A Volume and Valuation
The weight of empirical evidence demonstrates that shareholders
of target companies reap significant—and immediate—capital gains
from tendering into actual takeover bids.83 It follows that when: (1)
M&A activity decreases and/or (2) valuation of target companies is
less ambitious (i.e., lower premiums are paid), the benefits
attributable to Pprem also decrease.84 Ultimately, this relationship is
controlled by the relative volume of M&A activity multiplied by the
average premium received by target shareholders.
It is less clear what impact, if any, decreased takeover activity has
on the costs attributable to the market for corporate control. With
respect to Nineff, as M&A activity decreases overall, it is likely that the
number of inefficient takeovers (and thus Nineff) decreases as well.
However, the magnitude of this effect depends on whether takeovers
during downturns are more or less likely to be inefficient—from the
perspective of target shareholders—than those consummated during
boom periods. Furthermore, potentially offsetting this effect is the
fact that high G-Index (and presumably high E-Index) firms are
more likely to acquire companies.85 If, as seems likely, these
acquisitions are also more likely to be value-negative than those
pursued by less entrenched firms,86 then this inefficiency—from the
83. See supra notes 36, 54 and accompanying text.
84. It is also arguable—though highly speculative—that a substantial decrease in M&A
volume relative to prior periods would reduce the perceived likelihood of the takeover threats,
and thus reduce the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in mitigating agency
costs. If so, one would expect the magnitude of deterrence to be most strongly reduced in low
entrenchment companies (more highly entrenched companies already having insulated
themselves to a greater or lesser extent from that threat), further minimizing the variations in
stock valuation between companies of varying levels of entrenchment.
85. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 133–37.
86. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 77, at 328 (arguing that “managers of firms with
unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or
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perspective of the acquiror’s shareholders—may also contribute
meaningfully to the negative abnormal returns generated by
entrenched companies during boom periods. The cumulative impact
of these two factors (premiums to less entrenched companies and
negative-value acquisitions by highly entrenched companies), is
materially diminished as firm profitability decreases generally and
fewer firms—including highly entrenched firms—are able to finance
acquisitions.87
Finally, the effects of decreased M&A activity on short-termism
and managerial risk preferences (i.e., Ns-t) are similarly unclear. It is
possible that a substantial decrease in takeover volume relative to
prior periods would reduce the perceived likelihood of the takeover
threat, and thus mitigate the pressures leading to over-investment in
the short-term. This outcome seems unlikely, however, for at least
three reasons. First, the in terrorem effect of takeovers might be so
great that changes in the aggregate number of acquisitions have very
little impact on managers’ risk preferences and investment horizons.
Indeed, even during periods of surging M&A activity, the
probability of being the subject of a takeover bid for any given
company is quite low. This very concern might explain the explosion
in entrenchment levels experienced during 2006, as M&A activity
(and especially private equity transactions) reached a frenzied peak.
Second, due to the volatility of the takeover market—and the
economy in general—managers may be wary of trying to “time” the
M&A cycle for fear of a takeover in the event of an unexpected
recovery, even if deal flow has slowed significantly during a given
span. Finally, the effects of short-termism are predominantly lagged,
and thus any related costs manifesting during the sample period are
likely attributable to operational decisions made in prior periods.

even value-destroying mergers”); Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 136 (finding that high GIndex firms “engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment” including
acquisitions).
87. For example, Peter Galuszka reported that more than 1300 transactions were
abandoned, primarily due to the lack of available credit, falling earnings and market volatility.
Peter Galuszka, For M&A Activity, 2008 Was a Bust Year, BNET (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.bnet.com/blog/ceo/for-m-a-activity-2008-was-a-bust-year/1587 (commenting
that the M&A outlook for 2009 was questionable, given that “[n]ot many firms have a lot of
cash”).
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C. Recessionary Markets: A Hypothesis
Based on the foregoing framework, the benefits of the market for
corporate control, and particularly PRAC and Pprem, are greatest when:
(1) firm profitability—and thus the associated potential agency
cost—is high; and (2) the aggregate returns to target shareholders
attributable to changes of control {M&A volume * average
premium}—and consequently the associated premiums to
shareholders of low entrenchment firms and negative abnormal
returns to those of more entrenched firms—are high. Conversely, as
the magnitude of (1) and/or (2) decrease, as is typical in recessions,
there is a concomitant reduction in the P-element values.
The recent economic crisis was characterized by substantial
decreases in both of these factors. As to profitability, companies’
reported earnings dropped dramatically during the recent economic
crisis. Indeed, the S&P 500 reported its first ever quarter of negative
earnings per share (-$23.25) during 2008.88
Moreover, takeover activity during 2007 and 2008 was markedly
subdued as compared with the pace of M&A activity during the
period examined by BCF and GIM.89 In 2007, 496 deals were
consummated involving U.S. public company targets traded on the
NASDAQ and NYSE; in 2008, there were 457.90 By contrast an
average of nearly 800 such deals were consummated annually
between 1990 and 1999. On average, premiums for
NASDAQ/NYSE deals concluded during 2007 and 2008 (35.9% of
share price on the day prior to announcement of the deal) were
slightly lower than both the weighted mean premium observed from
1990–1999 (41.2%), and over the entire span from 1990–2009

88. S&P
500
Index
Earnings
Data,
STANDARD
&
POORS,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ home/en/us (follow “S&P 500” hyperlink under
“Categories” and “Featured Indices” then expand “Download Index Data” and follow “Index
Earnings” hyperlink) (free subscription required) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011); see also Kate
Gibson, S&P Heads to First Quarter Ever of Negative Earnings, MarketWatch (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-heads-first-quarterly-earnings-loss
(noting
six
straight quarters of negative earnings growth).
89. The merger and acquisition volume and valuation data described in this Part is
derived from the ThomsonONE M&A Deal Analysis database and detailed in Appendix E.
90. Overall public target M&A activity is comparable: 721 deals in 2007, 655 in 2008,
as compared with an average of nearly 1200 annually from 1990 to 1999. See infra Appendix
E.
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(39.3%).91 Collectively, these data points suggest that the net returns
to target shareholders attributable to M&A activity were, in relative
terms, substantially diminished during the recent economic crisis.
Based on the foregoing, and assuming that the decrease in Pelement costs is not completely offset by a similar decrease in Nelement costs,92 the model set forth herein predicts that that NSWmcc
is highest during periods of strong economic growth (such as the
1990s), but diminished during recessions. If the balance between Pand N-elements is close, one might even anticipate negative NSWmcc
as the N-element costs overtake the P-element benefits in certain
firms. This theoretical framework provides a testable hypothesis: the
correlation between entrenchment and negative stock returns during
the 1990s should dissipate (and might even reverse directionality)
during recessionary periods. Part IV turns to empirical evidence from
the recent economic crisis.
IV. ENTRENCHMENT AND STOCK RETURNS—JULY 2007 TO
DECEMBER 2008: DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS
To test the hypothesis set forth in Part III, this study adapts and
extends the GIM/BCF methodology to determine the correlation
between entrenchment and stock returns from July 2007 to
December 2008.93 First, equal-weight portfolios were created by
grouping together all firms with the same E-Index score.94 Then,
three series of regressions were performed using these portfolios: (1)
zero-investment portfolios were created by simultaneously shorting a
high entrenchment grouping while going long on a less entrenched
grouping (e.g., going long E0-1 while shorting E-6); (2) to control
for certain industry-effects, the same regressions were run on
industry-adjusted portfolios excluding the financial, real estate, and
91. See infra Appendix E. While it is notoriously difficult to assess takeover premiums
accurately (note, e.g., the anomalous average premium during 1994), the figures employed
herein are in line with those reported by other commentators. See, e.g., supra note 36.
92. The validity of this assumption, and in particular, the relative magnitude of each of
these costs and benefits, certainly merits further research.
93. This sample period tracks the time-frames used in other studies examining corporate
performance during the recent economic crisis. See, e.g., Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 6.
The end of the sample period is also dictated in part by data availability.
94. For the purposes of statistical analysis, E-0 and E-1 are grouped together due to the
exceptionally small number of E-0 observations during the sample period (6 in 2007, 4 in
2008). BCF employed a similar grouping methodology with respect to the E-5 and E-6 firms
in their study. See BCF, supra note 6, at 799.
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insurance firms; and (3) regressions were run on standalone
portfolios (e.g., E-4 by itself) to determine which of the E-Index
cohorts account for the observed abnormal returns. Finally, given the
surge in average entrenchment during the year prior to the
beginning of the sample period, equal-weight portfolios were created
by grouping together firms with similar changes in entrenchment
during 2006 (-E). Regressions were run on these portfolios to
assess the correlation between stock returns and -E.
A. Data Sources and the E-Index
Like BCF, this study employs a broad sample of U.S. public
companies, whose corporate governance structures are detailed in
the Corporate Takeover Defenses publication issued by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC,” now part of RiskMetrics,
which was recently acquired by MSCI, Inc.). The coverage universe
consists of the “Super S&P 1,500” (which comprises the S&P 500,
the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600), as well as
various other firms selected on the basis of market capitalization and
high institutional ownership levels.95 While there is some variation
between volumes as to companies covered, each volume provides
data for between 1,400 and 2,000 firms accounting for more than
90% of the total U.S stock market capitalization.96 Following BCF,
firms with dual class share structures and real estate investment trusts
(i.e., firms with SIC Code 6798) were excluded, as both of these
categories of companies have unique governance structures and
entrenchment mechanisms.97 The remaining sample for the test
period consists of 1,368 companies.
Company financial information, including SIC codes, stock
return data, and market capitalization information, was obtained
from the Center for Research in Security Prices monthly data files
and the Standard & Poor data collection.

95. See, e.g., Investor Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Takeover Defenses xi
(2006).
96. See BCF, supra note 6, at 796; Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 66, at 7.
IRRC volumes were published in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2006. More
recent data is available via the Wharton Research Data Services, available at
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/. Each volume contains data current as of December 31 of
the prior year.
97. BCF, supra note 6, at 797.
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To calculate abnormal returns, the three Fama-French
benchmark factors (MKTRF, HML, SMB) were employed along
with a momentum factor (MOM).98 Each of these monthly datapoints was obtained from Professor French’s data library.99 Following
both GIM and BCF, it was assumed that firms’ governance
provisions—as reported in a particular IRRC/Riskmetrics volume—
remained in place throughout the period covered by that volume.100
However, portfolio composition was adjusted as of January 2008 to
reflect any changes in E-Index scores between the 2007 and 2008
data.
E-Index data was obtained from Professor Bebchuk’s data
library.101 -E was derived by comparing E-Index data for companies
covered in both the 2006 and 2007 IRRC/Riskmetrics volumes.
This subset of the sample includes 1,088 companies.
The E-Index tracks the level of structural entrenchment in a
given firm.102 Each company is given an ordinal score (from 0 to 6)
based on the presence or absence of six corporate governance
structures: (1) a staggered board; (2) limits on shareholder bylaw
amendment; (3) supermajority voting requirements for merger
approval; (4) supermajority voting requirements for charter
amendments; (5) poison pills; and (6) golden parachutes. The first
four provisions are constitutional limitations on shareholder voting
power. Staggered boards divide directors into several (typically three)
classes, only one of which comes up for election in any given year.
Consequently, shareholders cannot oust a majority of the incumbent
management in a single vote, but must conduct—and win—two

98. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on
Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993) for a description of the three Fama-French
benchmarks, and Kenneth R. French, Details for Momentum Factor (Mom),
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_
DARTMOUTH.EDU,
Library/det_mom_factor.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) as to the momentum factor employed
herein. For additional detail on the latter, see generally Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence In
Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 passim (1997) (describing momentum effects).
http://mba.tuck.
99. Kenneth R. French, Data Library, DARTMOUTH.EDU,
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
100. While this assumption is admittedly artificial, BCF report that using alternative
“filling” methodologies do not alter their results. See BCF, supra note 6, at 796.
101. The E-Index data collections employed herein were obtained from Professor Lucian
Bebchuk’s Data Library, in February 2009 (for 2007 vintage data) and again in January 2010
(for 2008 vintage data). Lucian Arye Bebchuck, E-Index Data Collection, HARVARD.EDU,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
102. See BCF, supra note 6, at 784–85, 788.
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elections in sequential years. The three direct limits on shareholder
voting (as to bylaws, charter amendments and merger approval) each
enhance a target’s defenses by impeding shareholders’ ability to alter
a firm’s existing defensive arrangements and/or approve a proposed
change-of-control transaction. For example, to the extent that
insiders (or shareholders friendly to management) control a
meaningful, albeit not controlling, block of shares, they could
potentially veto any such transaction.103
The latter two provisions—poison pills and golden parachutes—
represent a target’s “takeover readiness.”104 Poison pills preclude, in
practice, the acquisition of any significant (usually 5, 10 or 15%)
block of shares on the open market, and thus create an exceptionally
strong deterrent to both tender offers and attempted proxy contests
to obtain control.105 Golden parachutes are executive compensation
agreements that provide substantial pecuniary benefits in the event
that executives are fired and/or demoted as a result of change-ofcontrol transactions, thus potentially marginalizing the deterrent
effect of the takeover market.106
Collectively, the E-Index provisions proxy for managerial
exposure to the market for corporate control. Low scores represent
lesser, and high scores greater, insulation from its effects. As
demonstrated by BCF, these six provisions fully drive GIM’s earlier
findings concerning firm value and stock returns, with the remaining
eighteen G-Index provisions providing little, if any, residual
explanatory power.107

103. For examples of this phenomenon, see Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1380–84 (Del. 1995), and Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore 771 A.2d 293, 315–18 (Del. Ch.
2000). Early studies also demonstrate the importance of voting rights to shareholders. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395,
407 (1983) (noting that classes of stock with stronger voting rights trade at a premium of two
to four percent relative to other classes); accord Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
104. See BCF, supra note 6, at 790.
105. Id. at 792.
106. For an in-depth discussion of each of these provisions, see id. at 790–94.
107. Id. at 823–24. For a detailed description of how and why these six factors were
selected, see id. at 788–95.
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B. The E-Index and Stock Returns: July 2007 to December 2008
1. Summary statistics—entrenchment
Entrenchment increased at an unprecedented level throughout
2006. While there had been only a slight upward trend in
entrenchment levels between 1990 and 2005, average entrenchment
increased drastically—from 2.5 to 3.7—by the end of 2006, and
declined only slightly (to 3.5) through 2007.108
BCF reported that as of 2002, entrenchment was more or less
evenly distributed between firms with an E-Index of 3 or more, and
firms with an E-Index of below 3. Based on 2007 and 2008 vintage
data, this distribution has changed drastically, with more than 75% of
firms at an E-Index of 3 or more throughout the sample period.109
Comparing 2006 and 2007 data, only 54 of 1,088 firms (less than
5%) reduced their E-Index level, 192 firms (17.6%) maintained their
level of entrenchment, and 843 (77.4%) further entrenched
themselves. Figure 2 illustrates the change in entrenchment (-E)
between 2006 and 2007.

108. While anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some of this surge in entrenchment is
attributable to the contemporaneous flurry of takeover activity during 2005 and 2006, a
rigorous inquiry into this question is beyond the scope of this Article, and certainly warrants
further investigation. It is also worth noting that RiskMetrics made several changes to its data
collection methodology when it acquired IRRC in 2007, including dropping some provisions
from coverage and altering the definitions of certain others. All of the E-Index provisions
remain in the coverage set, though the definition of golden parachutes was changed. Appendix
A compares the IRRC (1990–2006) and Riskmetrics (2007 to date) definitions for each of EIndex provisions. This change in methodology does not, however, seem to explain the steep
rise in entrenchment, as the proportion of firms with golden parachutes declined between the
two pertinent cohorts—nearly 78% of the 2006 coverage universe firms satisfied the golden
parachute criteria as compared with only 52% in 2007.
109. Historic entrenchment data, derived from the E-Index data-set, is set forth in
Appendix B.
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Difft =  + b1 * MKTRFt + b2 * HMLt + b3 * SMBt + b4 * Momt+ et
where MKTRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus
the risk-free rate, HMLt and SMBt are zero-investment benchmark
factors representing book-to-market (high minus low) and size
(small minus big) stock return effects for month t respectively, and
Momt proxies for trailing year momentum effects for time t. In this
regression, the variable  represents the abnormal monthly return of
the long-short portfolio.112
The results of these regressions starkly contrast with GIM and
BCF’s findings from earlier periods. First, the statistically significant,
negative correlation between entrenchment and stock price
disappeared entirely during the sample period. In fact, the most
extreme portfolio (going long E0-1 and shorting E-6), which
generated the largest abnormal returns for both GIM and BCF,
generated no abnormal returns at all during the sample period (1
basis point monthly). Second, whereas BCF found that inclusion of
firms towards the middle of the E-Index distribution generated
monotonically declining, but positive, abnormal returns during the
1990s, I find that similarly constructed portfolios would have
generated modest negative returns during the sample period. Two of
the four portfolios (E0-2/E4-6 and E0-3/E4-6) underperformed
the benchmark factors at a 5% significance level.113 Figure 3
illustrates these results.

112. See Fama & French, supra note 98, at 19–22; accord BCF, supra note 6, at 815.
113. Appendix C displays regression results for the long-short portfolios; Appendix D
displays regression results for the standalone E-Index and -E portfolios discussed infra.
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V. DISCUSSION

Three main findings emerge from this study. First, the highly
significant negative correlation between entrenchment and stock
returns identified by GIM and BCF disappeared entirely during the
sample period. In fact, there were no statistically significant positive
abnormal returns associated with any of the low-entrenchment
portfolios, whether long/short or standalone.116 Similarly, there were
no positive abnormal returns (significant or otherwise) associated
with firms that decreased their level of entrenchment during the year
prior to the sample period. In fact, a portfolio of negative -E firms
would have produced abnormal, though not statistically significant
losses.
Second, contrary to the predictions of the traditional model of
the market for corporate control, above-average entrenchment firms
generally outperformed below-average entrenchment firms during
the sample period. The extreme long/short portfolio (E0-1/E6)
produced trivial abnormal returns, but all of the more moderate
long/short portfolios produced economically meaningful (and in
two cases statistically significant) negative abnormal returns. As
demonstrated by the ex-financial regressions, these results are not
explained fully by the unique circumstances of financial sector firms.
While the performance of the financials impacted the magnitude of
abnormal returns to some degree, the trend identified above clearly
extended to the market as a whole given the persistent negative
returns attributable to four of the five portfolios, and the continued
statistical significance of the returns attributable to the E0-3/E4-6
portfolio.
The results from the standalone E-Index portfolio regressions
further illustrate that companies with moderate, above-average
entrenchment fared the best during the sample period. The strongest
individual cohort was the E4 portfolio, followed by the E3 and E5
portfolios. Returns dropped off sharply for firms closer to both ends
of the E-Index distribution. Particularly notable are the E0-1 and E6
portfolios, which would both have generated substantial negative
annualized abnormal returns (-5.5% and -8.3% respectively).

116. In this respect, my findings are consist with those of Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang,
supra note 66, who report that the positive abnormal returns associated with the E-Index
during the 1990s disappear during the period from 2000–2008.
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Third, all portfolios of firms that entrenched during 2006
generated positive abnormal returns, while those that reduced
entrenchment or maintained their level of entrenchment generated
negative abnormal returns. In fact, a portfolio of firms that
entrenched themselves the most during 2006 would have generated
the largest positive abnormal returns (2.8% annualized) of any -E
cohort, while firms that did not alter their level of entrenchment
fared the worst (-4.0% annualized abnormal returns). It is unclear
how much weight should be attributed to the -E findings, however,
given the lack of statistical significance.
How are these results best explained? While there is no
consensus about how to interpret the abnormal returns identified by
GIM and BCF (and herein),117 there are several potential
explanations. One possibility is the hypothesis and theoretical
framework set forth above in Parts II and III. As predicted, the
positive abnormal returns attributable to low-entrenchment firms
disappeared during the sample period. Moreover, given equalweighting, as in the long/short portfolios, above-average
entrenchment firms outperformed companies with below-average
entrenchment. The standalone portfolios provide further evidence
consistent with the theory that the N-element costs, such as shorttermism and/or skewed risk preferences, are economically
meaningful, and manifest to the greatest degree in the least
entrenched companies, which no longer enjoy large offsetting
benefits attributable to the P-elements in the equation. Firms that
were moderately shielded from the effects of the market for
corporate control (i.e., the E3, E4 and E5 portfolios) outperformed
those with the greatest exposure (E0-1 and E2) to that market.
Tellingly, both the E0-1 and E2 portfolios would have generated
economically significant negative abnormal returns.
These results are also consistent with the notion that the balance
between the benefits and costs of the market for corporate control is
fragile. In particular, while the most extreme long/short portfolio
would have generated no abnormal returns (or small, positive returns
ex-financials), once firms towards the mean of the E-Index
distribution were included in the portfolios, the abnormal returns
became negative and statistically significant.

117. See BCF, supra note 6, at 812.
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The E6 cohort might seem to diverge from the theoretical
framework set forth herein, but this is not a surprising result. Firms
that employ all six of the strongest entrenchment mechanisms have
removed themselves almost entirely from the market for corporate
control, and thus receive none of its disciplinary benefits. The theory
set forth above posits that the benefits attributable to the market for
corporate control are minimized during recessions, but not that they
are reduced to zero. Whereas moderate levels of entrenchment may
strike a balance between costs and benefits, full entrenchment—and
associated agency cost—is likely to tilt that balance regardless of the
prevailing economic climate, especially if the fully-entrenched
condition has persisted for any length of time. This explanation is
bolstered at least in part by the -E regression results. More than
half of the firms in the E6 cohort at the beginning of the sample
period are also in the 3+ -E portfolio, which would have generated
positive abnormal returns. Therefore, it appears that the substantial
negative abnormal returns attributable to the E6 cohort are driven
primarily by firms that had maintained a fully entrenched governance
structure for at least several years, as opposed to firms that had
entrenched themselves substantially during 2006.
There are, however, several other possible explanations that must
be considered. Given the relatively narrow sample period, these
results may be a statistical or economic anomaly. There might also be
a correlation between the E-Index factors and a common risk factor
that is, as yet, omitted from the standard asset pricing benchmarks.118
While there is other evidence consistent with this study’s findings,119
one important avenue for future research is to test, more rigorously,
the variable effects theory set forth herein employing a longer sample
period, correlating the performance of similarly situated firms across
various market conditions, and testing whether this pattern holds for
118. See, e.g., BCF, supra note 6, at 812. Similarly, there could be a hidden variable that
explains the abnormal returns. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 139–42. For example,
extremely large companies tend to be, on average, much less entrenched than smaller
companies. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. As BCF note, one of the reasons for this reduced
level of entrenchment is that these companies are unlikely to be the subject of takeover bids
purely because of their enormous market capitalization. See BCF, supra note 6, at 799–800. In
accordance with the theoretical framework set out in Part III, as the imminence of the takeover
threat is minimized, the salutary impact of the market for corporate control is also reduced.
Thus, while the largest firms may occupy lower than average levels of the E-Index, they may
not generate the expected positive abnormal returns that prior studies have attributed to lowentrenchment companies.
119. See supra notes 13–14, and accompanying text.
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earlier market downturns and whether it has continued explanatory
power during periods of economic stagnation.
Perhaps more importantly, correlation does not necessarily
indicate causation. Indeed, the causal arrow may point in the
opposite direction.120 While this question has been debated
vigorously as to the GIM and BCF findings, the causation-related
critiques levied against those studies do not seem to have to the same
force in the context presented herein. First, as Beltratti and Stulz
argue, econometric studies are often riddled with concerns about
endogeneity, but such concerns are less troubling in the instant case
because it is highly unlikely that most market participants could have
anticipated the depth and breadth of the economic crisis (to the
extent that they anticipated a downturn at all) or its potential effects
on their firms.121
Second, the reverse-causation narrative employed to challenge
the GIM and BCF findings seems inapposite to the results described
here. To date, the crux of the causation debate is whether high
entrenchment causes future underperformance, or whether managers
of low-value firms (or who expect poor future performance ex ante)
entrench themselves prophylactically to reduce the likelihood of a
takeover.122 This explanation makes little sense when inverted: why
would managers expecting strong future performance entrench
themselves or remain entrenched? Thus, while causality cannot be
inferred with any certainty from these results, the traditional reversecausation hypothesis does not appear to have much explanatory
power.123 Of course, this raises an important question for further
120. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 69, at 655; Lehn et al., supra note 69, at 907; BCF,
supra note 6, at 823.
121. See Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 4. The authors reach this conclusion even as
to the banking sector—arguably one of the few industries in a legitimate position to gauge the
impact of the coming storm. As illustrated above, however, the findings in this study extend to
the broader market, which presumably had less information concerning the likely magnitude of
the financial crisis.
122. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 69, at 656; Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 137–
39; Lehn et al., supra note 69, at 908.
123. One plausible explanation, consistent with both the standard reverse-causation
narrative and the cost-component of the NSWmcc equation presented herein, is that managers
simply got it wrong: firms that had been underperforming their peers did not expect to
outperform their peers and entrenched themselves as a result of the massive surge in M&A
activity during the period prior to the financial crisis. But, these companies collectively
performed better during the financial crisis due, perhaps, to their more conservative business
strategies or long-term investment horizons made possible by reduced exposure to the market
for corporate control.
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investigation: why did previously entrenched firms, or those that
entrenched immediately prior to the sample period, perform better?
While this Article’s findings are suggestive, they cannot conclusively
answer the question.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examines the correlation between managerial
entrenchment and stock returns during the economic crisis of 2007–
2008. Unlike earlier studies, which found highly significant, negative
correlations between high entrenchment and returns during the
1990s, more entrenched firms fared better in the aggregate than less
entrenched companies during the sample period. In fact, the best
performing group of firms was that with moderate, above-average
levels of entrenchment. Further, firms that entrenched the most
during the year immediately prior to the sample period
outperformed firms that decreased their level of entrenchment or
maintained a consistent level of entrenchment throughout.
The findings presented are largely consistent with the theoretical
framework developed herein, in which the net impact of the market
for corporate control is a balance of costs and benefits, and varies
depending on macroeconomic climate. Specifically, one should
expect that the benefits of the takeover threat are minimized during
recessions, and thus the correlation between low entrenchment
companies and positive abnormal returns observed during periods of
strong economic growth should be weakened. These findings also
suggest that this balance is fragile, and that the costs could, for some
companies, outweigh the benefits. While the results of this study do
not (and cannot) prove the theory set forth herein, they present
preliminary evidence that while the market for corporate control
provides a measure of managerial accountability, its net wealtheffects can vary, and that less entrenchment is not necessarily
correlated with increased shareholder value during all periods.
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APPENDIX A: E-INDEX DEFINITIONS
IRRC Governance Definitions (1990–2006)
Classified board or Staggered board:
A board of directors, divided, for the purpose of election, into
separate classes. In most instances there are three classes, with the
directors in each class serving overlapping three-year terms.
Staggering directors’ terms makes it more difficult for dissidents to
seize control of a target company immediately, even if they control a
majority of the company’s stock, since only one-third of the directors
stand for election in any one year. With a classified board, also
known as a staggered board, the shareholders’ ability to affect the
makeup of the board is limited because it would take at least two
elections to replace a majority of the board.
Golden Parachute:
A severance agreement/contract between a company and an
executive contingent on a change in corporate control.
Poison Pill:
Shareholder rights plans are among the more complicated antitakeover devices. Although their terms and conditions vary
considerably, the purpose of a poison pill is to force potential bidders
to negotiate with a target company’s board of directors. If the board
approves the deal, it may redeem the pill. If the board does not
approve a bid and the potential acquirer proceeds anyway, the pill
would be “triggered,” causing actions that would make the target
financially unattractive or dilute the voting power of the potential
acquirer. Under a typical plan, shareholders are issued rights to
purchase stock in their own company or in the acquiring company at
a steep discount (usually half price) if a hostile bidder acquires a
certain percentage (usually 15% or 20%) of the outstanding shares.
Unlike anti-takeover charter and bylaw amendments, poison pills do
not have to be ratified by shareholders.
Supermajority vote requirement:
A vote that requires support from more than a majority of the shares
entitled to vote. Supermajority provisions establish shareholder vote
requirements that are higher than the minimum levels set by state
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law to approve a merger or other business combination. They
typically require the approval of the holders of two-thirds, 75% or
80% or more of the outstanding shares for actions that otherwise
would require simple majority approval.
Source: IRRC Governance Definitions (1990–2006), Wharton Research
Data Services, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/
_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_115RiskMetrics/Overview%20of%20
IRRC%20Legacy%20Governance%20Database%20on%20WRDS.cfm (last
visited Jan. 25, 2011).

RiskMetrics Governance Definitions (2007–Present)
Classified board or Staggered board:
A board of directors, divided, for the purpose of election, into
separate classes. In most instances there are three classes, with the
directors in each class serving overlapping three-year terms.
Staggering directors’ terms makes it more difficult for dissidents to
seize control of a target company immediately, even if they control a
majority of the company’s stock, since only one-third of the directors
stand for election in any one year. With a classified board, also
known as a staggered board, the shareholders’ ability to affect the
makeup of the board is limited because it would take at least two
elections to replace a majority of the board.
Golden Parachute:
A severance agreement/contract between a company and an
executive contingent on a change in corporate control. [Note that
data in this field may be inconsistent for the 2006 through 2008
data years; in some cases “Yes” indicate that an NEO at the company
has such a contract but in other cases “Yes” indicates that an NEO at
the company has a contract that provide for a cash severance
payment > 3X salary + bonus].
Poison Pill:
Shareholder rights plans are among the more complicated antitakeover devices. Although their terms and conditions vary
considerably, the purpose of a poison pill is to force potential bidders
to negotiate with a target company’s board of directors. If the board
approves the deal, it may redeem the pill. If the board does not
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approve a bid and the potential acquirer proceeds anyway, the pill
would be “triggered,” causing actions that would make the target
financially unattractive or dilute the voting power of the potential
acquirer. Under a typical plan, shareholders are issued rights to
purchase stock in their own company or in the acquiring company at
a steep discount (usually half price) if a hostile bidder acquires a
certain percentage (usually 15% or 20%) of the outstanding shares.
Unlike anti-takeover charter and bylaw amendments, poison pills do
not have to be ratified by shareholders.
Supermajority vote requirement:
A vote that requires support from more than a majority of the shares
entitled to vote. Supermajority provisions establish shareholder vote
requirements that are higher than the minimum levels set by state
law to approve a merger or other business combination. They
typically require the approval of the holders of two-thirds, 75% or
80% or more of the outstanding shares for actions that otherwise
would require simple majority approval.
Source: Risk Metrics Governance Definitions (2007–Present), WHARTON
RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/
support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_115RiskMetrics/Risk
Metrics%20Governance%20Definitions.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL ENTRENCHMENT DATA
Historic Entrenchment Data (Ex. Dual Class Firms)
Year

Average Entrenchment

E0

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

1990

2.229

181

249

328

342

197

50

9

1993

2.324

149

236

336

341

220

56

5

1995

2.310

151

243

350

346

228

52

3

1998

2.273

181

328

439

430

271

48

10

2000

2.452

125

297

409

459

305

64

10

2002

2.498

120

255

446

457

308

75

7

2004

2.549

104

257

468

515

337

71

7

2006

2.505

90

294

453

482

327

62

4

2007

3.667

6

51

188

413

379

299

95

2008

3.485

4

52

245

415

332

253

61

Source: Entrenchment data is derived from Lucian A. Bebchuk, E-Index
Data Collection, HARVARD.EDU, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
bebchuk/data.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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APPENDIX C: MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS
Long/Short Portfolios (July 2007 – December 2008)
Long/Short Portfolio

Baseline Model

Ex-Financial

E-Index 0-1 / E-Index 6

0.01
(0.374)
-0.52
(0.411)
-0.32
(0.333)
-0.58***
(0.251)
-0.44***
(0.169)

0.36
(0.500)
-0.27
(0.613)
-0.19
(0.465)
-0.32
(0.298)
-0.34**
(0.189)

E-Index 0-1 / E-Index 5-6
E-Index 0-1-2 / E-Index 5-6
E-Index 0-1-2 / E-Index 4-5-6
E-Index 0-1-2-3 / Index 4-5-6

This table illustrates the monthly abnormal returns for various longshort portfolios derived from the E-Index data-set. Both the baseline
and ex-financial models regress excess returns from each long-short
portfolio on the three Fama-French factors—which benchmark
market, firm size, and book-to-market effects—along with a
momentum factor (each of which was obtained from Ken French’s
data library). The ex-financial portfolios exclude firms classified as
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, and Trading according to the
Fama-French 48 category industry classification. See E. Fama & K.
French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. Fin. Ec. 153, 179–181
(1997) (listing categories by SIC codes). All portfolios were
constructed using equal-weightings of each component. Portfolios
were adjusted in January 2008 to account for E-Index changes
between 2007 and 2008 data. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and significance at the 15%, 10%, and 5% is indicated
by *, **, and *** respectively.
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APPENDIX D: MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS
Standalone E-Index and E Portfolios
(July 2007 – December 2008)
Abnormal Return
Standalone Portfolio (Standard Error)
Negative ΔE
0 ΔE
1 ΔE
2 ΔE
3+ ΔE
E0-1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6

-0.06
(0.472)
-0.34
(0.226)
0.12
(0.191)
0.04
(0.191)
0.23
(0.314)
-0.46
(0.317)
-0.22
(0.257)
-0.01
(0.187)
0.26*
(0.168)
-0.03
(0.279)
-0.69**
(0.360)

This table illustrates the monthly abnormal returns for various
standalone E-Index and ΔE portfolios derived from the 2006, 2007
and 2008 E-Index data-sets. Returns were calculated as above,
pursuant to the baseline model (see Appendix C, supra), except that
ΔE portfolio composition remained constant throughout the sample
period. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and significance
at the 15%, 10% and 5% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***
respectively.
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APPENDIX E: ANNUAL MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEAL VOLUME
AND VALUATION
U.S. Public Company Targets – NYSE and NASDAQ
(1999-2008)
Year

Number of Deals
NYSE/
All Public
NASDAQ
Targets

Average Deal
Premium (%)
NYSE/
NASDAQ Only

1990

639

21.13

1003

1991

531

859

25.5

1992

539

843

17.84

1993

594

922

28.83

1994

863

1301

169.61

1995

1002

1456

31.18

1996

1093

1641

16.16

1997

927

1327

23.32

1998

918

1323

23.56

1999

875

1231

41.84

2000

839

1189

31.59

2001

616

858

37.06

2002

405

605

29.69

2003

385

572

54.39

2004

354

517

22.2

2005

327

510

59.63

2006

391

570

22.99

2007

496

721

26.42

2008

457

655

46.19

N

12251

18103

Mean
(Entire Period)

645

953

38.38

Mean (2007-2008)

477

688

36.31

Mean (1990-1999)
Weighted Mean
(Entire Period)

798

1191

39.90
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Weighted Mean
(2007-2008)
Weighted Mean
(1990-1999)

35.90
41.21

Source: Data derived from the ThomsonONE M&A Deal Analysis
database, ThomsonOne.com, https://www.thomsonone.com (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011) filtering for: Target Nation (United States); Target Public
Status (Public); and where applicable Target Primary Stock Exchange by
Country (NASDAQ or New York). Deal activity is categorized by year
based
on
the
date
a
merger
or
acquisition
becomes
effective/unconditional. Deal premiums are calculated by comparing the
deal price to the target company's stock price close one day prior to the
deal announcement.
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